Washington, London, and Berlin

ation, to sign up to an “investment agreement” with China — despite calls from Biden’s people to hold off (not just because of what was happening in Xinjiang but also in Hong Kong). Germany’s big manufacturing companies see profits from China as vital to their prospects.

See yesterday's post on Volkswagen in Xinjiang for more on why China is so important for VW – and for Germany.

So right from the start there are clear policy differences between the US and Germany, and hence between the US and the EU. As Lawson concludes:

Boris Johnson’s Brexity government in London is not going to be Biden’s bête noire in the western alliance. It is Berlin and Brussels whose decisions are likely to infuriate Joe B. And he does have one thing in common with Donald Trump: a short fuse.

Not to mention the issue of military spending, where the US has long provided cover for a Germany that's been unprepared to finance its own defence – while Germany develops a lucrative trading arrangement with America's number one enemy.